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Abstract 
Analyzing Norwegian firms, we find that public firms hold more cash and have lower 
operating performance, compared to private firms. These results indicate presence of agency 
costs in public firms, which lead to cash hoarding, as managers value the flexibility cash 
provides. We find evidence that excess cash has a negative effect on performance. The result 
is robust towards different measures of performance, and implicates that shareholders in public 
firms should pay more attention to the firm’s cash policy. When competition is low, cash has 
a negative effect on performance, while there is no significant effect when competition is high. 
This indicates support for holding excess cash in competitive industries. 
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1. Introduction 
The main goal of this thesis is to examine differences in cash holdings between public and 
private firms and detect agency problems affecting cash levels in public firms. The motivation 
behind our choice of subject is both our interest in finance and managerial decisions, and the 
wish to understand the recent international trend in rising cash holdings. Research on private 
firms is interesting, as private firms contribute to the majority of the economy and is relatively 
under-analyzed. We perform our analyses on Norwegian data, as Norway is a highly 
developed country with access to detailed data on private firms. 
First, we analyze the determinants of corporate cash holdings, with focus on differences 
between public and private firms. Being public provides easier access to external capital, 
which should decrease precautionary cash holdings. However, a greater separation between 
shareholders and managers in public firms may lead to agency costs, which may affect cash 
holdings. We use the assumption of less agency costs in private firms to identify how agency 
costs affect cash holdings in public firms. 
Second, we investigate differences between public and private firms’ speed of adjustments 
(SOA) to a target cash level. We differentiate between the case of excess cash and cash 
shortfall, to get insight in how managers in public and private firms respectively adjust cash 
levels in these two conditions. This analysis provides further insight in how agency costs affect 
cash policies in public firms. Third, we analyze differences in how public and private firms 
disgorge excess cash. With agency costs, managers have different incentives in the use of 
excess cash, which makes this analysis useful in detecting agency costs. 
Further, we look at performance, measured by Return on Assets (ROA). We focus on both 
investigating differences between public and private firms, and analyze how cash, and 
particularly excess cash, affects performance. We also analyze cash holdings’ effect on 
investment. 
Finally, we create a new matched sample based on Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), which 
measure market concentration, and analyze how HHI affects the results on cash holdings and 
performance. There are two main reasons why this approach adds value to our thesis. First, 
competition disciplines managers, which potentially reduce agency costs. Second, this 
analysis detect whether there exists product market competition motives for holding cash. 
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Access to data on private firms have gotten more extensive internationally, which increases 
research on the field. Prior research concludes that private firms have higher borrowing costs 
(Saunders & Steffen, 2011), rely mostly on debt financing (Brav, 2009), pay out choppier 
dividends (Michaely & Roberts, 2012), invest more (Asker, Farre-Mensa, & Ljungquist, 2014) 
and hold less cash (Gao, Harford, & Li, 2013). Comparative research on cash holdings in 
Norwegian public and private firms have not been previously published.  
We find that public firms on average hold more cash than their private counterparts do. The 
difference varies between samples and with the amount of control variables. Nonetheless, 
public firms have on average at least 10% more cash than private firms do. In the years 2000-
2007, public firms have on average 20% more cash, while in the years from 2008-2012, we 
find no significant differences. We believe that the difference before 2008 is due to agency 
costs, as agency costs is the only motive that predicts higher cash holdings for public firms. 
The differences between public and private firms becomes more ambiguous when matching 
on HHI. Further, we find evidence that size correlates negatively with cash level. 
Consequently, there are economies of scale related to cash holdings 
Private firms have better performance than public firms do. We find evidence that cash 
negatively affect performance for public firms, and indications of the same relationship for 
private firms. This result suggests that many firms hold too much cash, and this cash holding 
is particularly an issue for public firms. These results are robust towards different measures of 
performance. Cash has a stronger negative effect on performance when competition is low, 
even though cash level on average is lower in that case. This result indicates existence of 
product market competition arguments for holding excess cash. 
To sum up the main findings in this thesis, public firms have higher cash holdings than their 
private counterparts do. From a shareholder perspective, there are no rational arguments for 
this difference. Excess cash has a negative effect on performance. Consequently, the results 
have implications for shareholders, particularly in public firms, who have incentives to pay 
more attention to the firm’s cash policy.  
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2. Theories on cash holding 
Cash is an important component of a firm’s assets, and it is thus important to understand the 
different motives for holding cash both from a governance perspective and from a management 
perspective. We will focus on the general theories on cash holdings in this section, while we 
get more specific when we build our hypotheses. In a perfect capital market as Miller & 
Modigliani proposed, there is no reason to hold excess cash. A firm can then raise cash 
frictionless. Nevertheless, firms have increased cash holdings the last decades. The cash-to-
asset ratio for American firms has more than doubled from 10.5% in 1980 to 23.2% in 2006 
(Bates, Kahle, & Stulz, 2009). They argue that the increase in cash holding is due to higher 
cash flow volatility, less capital expenditures, less working capital and higher R&D 
expenditures, which are precautionary arguments. With the increase in cash holdings, the 
academic interest has increased accordingly. The trend of increased cash holdings was 
extended after the financial crisis and strongest in multinational R&D intensive firms 
(Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 2013).  There are four main motives for holding cash, the 
transaction motive, precautionary motive, agency motive and tax motive (Bates, Kahle, & 
Stulz, 2009). We will further include theory on competition motives. Our main goal is to detect 
how agency costs affect cash levels in public firms. 
Managers will optimize cash level based on the different motives. In all the motives described 
except the agency motive, there is alignment between the interests of shareholders and 
managers. The agency motive represents differences in interest, which will decrease 
shareholder value.  
2.1 The transaction motive 
A firm needs operating cash for the daily activities as capital inflows and outflows do not 
always correspond in time. There are transaction costs related to converting a non-financial 
asset into cash to perform payments. Operating cash is the minimum of cash needed for any 
rational firm. Cash holdings above operating cash is defined as excess cash. If a firm is short 
on cash, it has to either raise funds in the capital market, sell assets or renegotiate financial 
contracts, which causes transaction costs. On the other hand, holding too much cash increase 
opportunity costs, since cash can be invested in projects that are more profitable. By 
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minimizing the sum of transaction costs and opportunity costs of holding cash, one can derive 
the optimal amount of cash for a given firm (Baumol, 1952; Orr & Miller, 1966). 
The transaction cost depends on a firm’s debt rating, collateral, cash-flow uncertainty and the 
length of the cash conversion cycles (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 1999). Large 
firms will hold less cash relative to assets than smaller firms do, due to economies of scale to 
cash holdings (Mulligan, 1997). We assume the transaction demand for cash will decrease 
over time for all firms because financial intermediaries become more effective in handling 
transactions. The need for operating cash by firms is also decreasing as cash management has 
become more efficient. Firms also decrease working capital because they hold less inventory 
(Bates, Kahle, & Stulz, 2009). We would expect private firms to have equal or higher optimal 
cash level based on transaction motives due to less access to external capital for private firms, 
compared to public firms. 
2.2 The precautionary motive 
Cash holding works as a risk management tool. Firms will hold cash to protect themselves 
against cash flow shocks. These shocks can force firms to drop valuable investments due to 
dry or expensive external capital markets. Under the financial crisis, firms experienced the 
value of internal cash when capital markets tightened, as high cash holdings provide a valuable 
hedge against financial frictions. Precautionary demand for cash has been studied as early as 
in Keynes (1936). Opler et al. (1999) find that firms with strong growth opportunities, riskier 
cash flows and poor access to external capital hold more cash. Financially constrained firms 
put a greater value on cash than those with fewer frictions (Faulkender & Wang, 2006; 
Pinkowitz & Williamson, 2007; Han & Qiu, 2007). They also save a greater portion of their 
cash when raising external capital (Almeida, Campello, & Weisbach, 2005; Denis & Sibilkov, 
2009). The stock market value cash holdings higher when firms are less diversified (Tong, 
2011).  Absence of bond ratings or ratings below investment grade are associated with higher 
cash levels (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 1999). Bates et al. (2009) find partial 
explanation for the increase in cash holding in public firms by precautionary motives. 
Liquidity has a premium and being short on liquid assets is costly for a firm. The firm may 
need to cut back on investments and dividends or sell assets (Bates, Kahle, & Stulz, 2009). 
Ehling and Haushalter (2014) find differences in cash holdings based on size under 
macroeconomic or industry shocks. Large firms use additional debt, while small firms reduce 
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liabilities. During the shock, small firms with more cash outperformed small firms with less 
cash. They show that the value of cash is largest in negative market conditions.  
There has been an increase in supply of derivatives and improvements in forecasting and 
control. This suggests a decrease in precautionary demand for cash. On the other hand, there 
has been an increase in idiosyncratic risk, which is unhedgeable and thus increases the 
precautionary demand (Campbell, Lettau, Burton, & Xu, 2001; Irvine & Pontiff, 2008). Cash 
is an alternative to derivatives, since it reduces downside exposure, while keeping the upside.  
Cash holdings are associated with industry cash flow volatility and are used to reduce 
underinvestment when external capital is costly and growth opportunities are present (Harford 
J. , 1999; Kim, Mauer, & Sherman, 1998; Partch & Mikkelson, 2003). Harford et al. (2006) 
find that firms with high cash holdings are more likely to maintain investment in industry 
downturns. Acharya et al. (2005) find that financially constrained firms with low correlation 
between operating cash flows and investment opportunities, save cash instead of paying back 
debt. This implies that cash is more than negative debt, and thus has precautionary 
propositions. Lins et al. (2010) find different purposes for excess cash and lines of credit. 
While excess cash guards against future cash flow shocks in downturns, lines of credit is an 
option to exploit future business opportunities in good times. Cash is commonly used to 
manage risk in private firms, which often lack the expertise needed to use financial derivatives 
(Ehling & Haushalter, 2014). We assume that private firms have a higher precautionary 
demand for cash since they have less access to external capital markets, and thus incentives 
for higher cash holdings, compared to public firms. 
2.3 The agency motive 
Managers are traditionally assumed to maximize shareholder value without pursuing own 
objectives. Agency costs arise when the interest of managers diverge from those of 
shareholders.  In the free cash flow hypothesis, Jensen (1986) argue that entrenched managers 
retain cash rather than pay dividends to shareholders when the firm has poor investment 
opportunities. With an increase in free cash flow, agency costs increase. When shareholders 
have low influence over management, the management will stockpile more of the generated 
cash flow (Harford, Mansi, & Maxwell, 2008). The challenge for shareholders is to provide 
enough internal slack to avoid underinvestment, while not facilitate for overinvestment (Stulz, 
1990). The point made was that internal funds are key conflicts between owners and 
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management. Agency problems are assumed to be larger in public firms, with more 
asymmetric information between shareholders and management, and less possibility and 
incentive for monitoring the management, since ownership is usually more dispersed and the 
shares are more liquid (Asker, Farre-Mensa, & Ljungquist, 2014). As a minor shareholder you 
can either express concerns at the general meeting or sell your shares. 
There are different theories of agency costs, and how they affect cash holdings and investment. 
The empire building theory states that managers have an incentive to increase firm size 
regardless of the investment profitability (Stein J. C., 2003). This empire building oppose the 
interests of shareholders, who value profitability. Managers will spend all available funds on 
investment projects (Jensen, 1986). This theory predicts higher investment, while the 
predictions of cash holdings is ambiguous. Cash level will be cyclical for a given firm, 
depending on whether the cash is stocked in wait for or recently spent on investments. 
Managers spend cash on acquisitions or capital expenditures that reduce firm value rather than 
pay out dividends (Harford, Mansi, & Maxwell, 2008; Richardson, 2006). These activities, 
increase CEO compensation, even if it destroys shareholder value (Harford & Lee, 2007).  
The quiet life theory by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) states that managers may be prone 
to inertia and passivity when making difficult decisions. Managers that want to enjoy the quiet 
life will have an incentive to stock cash as a buffer to avoid making tough decisions (Gao, 
Harford, & Li, 2013). This is different from precautionary motives because this relates to the 
manager’s personal preference rather than the best interest for the firm’s shareholders. 
The theory of short-termism states that managers are too focused on short-term goals, 
prioritizing next quarters reporting over long term shareholder value (Narayanan, 1985). Even 
if it increases market value in the short-term, it may lead to underinvestment, less use of cash 
and a lower share price in the long-term. 
To sum up the different theories on agency cost, both the free cash flow hypothesis and the 
quiet life theory have clear predictions of a positive correlation between agency costs and cash 
holdings. The theory of short-termism suggests underinvestment, which may lead to higher 
cash level, but the relationship is more ambiguous. The empire building theory predicts a more 
cyclical cash level for firms affected by agency costs, but on average no clear trend. We build 
our hypotheses on the assumption that agency costs leads to higher cash level.  
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Corporate governance can differ both on country-level and firm-level. On a country-level, 
Dittmar et al. (2003) find that firms in countries with weak legal investor protection hold more 
cash than firms in countries with stronger investor protection. The market value of a firm’s 
cash holding is valued lower in these countries (Dittmar, Marth-Smith, & Servaes, 2003; 
Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 2006). However, on a firm-level, Harford et al (2008) find 
that firms with weak shareholder rights spend more cash.  
There are several studies trying to identify agency costs. Those in favor have been presented, 
but there are also studies that do not find evidence of agency costs. Mikkelson and Partch 
(2003) did not find differences in performance between high and low cash holding firms and 
Bates et al. (2009) explain the differences between the firms with firm characteristics and 
precautionary motives.  
2.4 The tax motive 
When a multinational firm has foreign income, a firm can hold cash abroad to delay 
repatriation tax payments. This will increase cash holdings, especially for firms in countries 
with high repatriating tax (Foley, Hartzell, Titman, & Twite, 2007). Pinkowitz et al. (2014) 
analyze the trend in US firms of increase in cash holdings, and explain the increase in cash not 
by high repatriating tax, but by precautionary motives and increases in R&D investment. We 
do not have access to data on foreign income, so tax motives are not analyzed in our thesis. 
2.5 Product market competition motives 
The determinants of corporate cash holdings are developing. Cash holdings have a strategic 
dimension that may influence product market choices both direct and indirect (Frezard, 2010). 
Cash holdings as a buffer is effective in avoiding competition, even more effective than low 
debt (Frezard, 2010). Cash-rich firms with strong balance sheets can compete more 
aggressively (Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990). They can cut their product prices, extend 
marketing, relocate or hire workers that are more productive, which can give them a 
competitive edge. High cash holdings have a signaling effect, as having excess cash on the 
balance sheet may influence competitors’ market behavior. It can prevent entry or capacity 
expansion from competitors, because the firm has financial muscles to defend its position 
(Benoit, 1984). Frezard (2010) find that US cash-rich firms gained future market share at the 
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expense of industry rivals with less cash. Ehling & Haushalter (2014) draw the same 
conclusion for Norwegian firms.  
Cash holdings are important in the management of predation risk (Haushalter, Klasa, & 
Maxwell, 2007). When financial constraints hinders investment in growth opportunities, 
predatory threats is more likely to occur (Zingales, 2002; Campello, 2006; Kovenock & 
Philips, 1997). In downturns, maintaining investment is vital to sustain the firm’s market share. 
This is especially relevant with investment in R&D. Mikkelson and Partch (2003) find that 
firms with high cash holdings were both more R&D intensive and had a higher operating 
performance. The market value of cash holdings is also higher in R&D intensive industries 
(Denis & Sibilkov, 2009; Brown & Petersen, 2011). R&D is difficult to fund externally due 
to the lack of assets as collateral and asymmetric information about the R&D’s value. R&D is 
mainly funded by volatile sources such as cash flow and stock issues (Brown & Petersen, 
2011). R&D intensive firms keep high cash holdings to ensure that they will be able to 
continue this funding internally, even when affected by shocks (Brown & Petersen, 2011).  
There is a substitute relationship between the use of derivatives and cash holdings in a product 
market context (Haushalter, Klasa, & Maxwell, 2007). Firms with less cash and more debt 
will use more derivatives to be able to respond to rivals’ strategic moves.  
All else equal, competition motives should be equal for public and private firms. 
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3. Hypotheses 
Based on the theory on cash holdings and agency costs, we develop four hypotheses for our 
analysis. The different hypotheses are not alternative hypotheses, but hypotheses for different 
analyses based on the same initial assumption of higher agency costs in public compared to 
private firms.  We believe any difference in cash level between public and private firms are 
due to either the transactions motive, precautionary motive or agency problems. The other 
motives for holding cash should not result in systematic differences between public and private 
firms. The transaction and precautionary motives predict higher cash holdings for private 
firms, due to less access to external capital, while the agency motive predicts higher cash 
holdings for public firms. The observable difference in cash level is the net of the different 
effects. Higher cash holdings for public firms will confirm the hypothesis of larger agency 
problems in public firms, as all other motives for cash holdings predicts either higher cash 
holdings for private firms or no systematic differences. This intuition leads to hypothesis 1, 
for our analysis of cash holdings. 
Hypothesis 1: Public firms hold more cash 
Second, we analyze firms’ speed of adjustment to a target cash level. We believe a manager 
preferring high cash holding have incentive to adjust cash level upwards in the case of a cash 
shortfall, but less incentive to adjust cash level downwards in the case of excess cash. With 
agency problems in public firms, we believe managers in public firms will adjust cash level 
downwards slower in the case of excess cash, compared to managers in private firms. In the 
case of cash shortfall, we believe managers in public firms will adjust cash level upwards 
faster, or at least equally fast, compared to managers in private firms. This intuition leads to 
hypothesis 2.  
Hypothesis 2: Public firms are slower to adjust cash level downwards in the case of excess 
cash, but faster to adjust upwards in the case of cash shortfall 
Our third analysis addresses the question on how firms disgorge excess cash. We look at 
increase in dividend payments, investment and debt repayment respectively. The most 
interesting analysis is on dividend payments. A manager preferring high cash holding have 
incentive to stock excess cash instead of paying out dividends to shareholders. Consequently, 
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hypothesis 3 states that managers in public firms are less likely to spend excess cash on 
dividend payments compared to managers in private firms. 
Hypothesis 3: Public firms are less likely to spend excess cash on dividends 
Our analysis of performance, measured by Return on Assets (ROA), investigates how cash 
affects performance. We believe too much cash has a negative effect on ROA, as cash usually 
generates lower return than the operations do in a well-functioning firm. As agency theory 
predicts cash holdings above an optimal level for firms affected by agency problems, 
hypothesis 4 predicts a stronger negative effect from excess cash on performance for public 
firms than for private firms. 
Hypothesis 4: Excess cash have a stronger negative effect on performance for public firms 
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4. Methodology 
4.1 Data and sample 
We use Centre for applied research at NHH’s (SNF) database on accounting and corporate 
data for all Norwegian firms and consolidated groups from 1992-2012. The database is 
available for researchers at SNF and both student and faculty at the Norwegian School of 
Economics (NHH). SNF is owned by NHH (85%) and the SNF foundation (15%). The data is 
delivered annually from the Brønnøysund Register Centre via Bisnode D&B Norway AS and 
in cooperation with Menson Business Economics AS. The database has been exposed to errors 
and missing values in the reported figures and variability in variable names. Hence, the 
database is revised and standardized several times. The latest revision took place in 2013, with 
a small extension in 2014, by Aksel Mjøs, dr. oecon, associate professor at the Department of 
Finance at NHH, in cooperation with Endre Berner and Marius Olving. The original 
documentation was  initiated by Aksel Mjøs in cooperation with Karoline Øksnes (Berner, 
Mjøs, & Olving, 2014).  
The accounting information contains figures from the income statements and balance sheets. 
For consolidated groups there are reporting on both the parent companies and the subsidiaries 
separately, in addition to reporting for the whole group. The subsidiary will act in the best 
interest of the controlling parent. Hence, we treat the whole group as one entity and thus 
replace figures for parent company with consolidated figures and delete figures for the 
subsidiary. The corporate data contains a number of non-accounting variables, such as 
information about the firm, ownership and industry.  
4.2 Cleaning 
In the original dataset we have 3,454,096 firm-year observations for 21 years (1992-2012). 
Following prior work including Opler et al. (1999), Gao et al. (2013), and Asker et al. (2014), 
we exclude financial firms and foreign firms. Further, we only keep limited liability companies 
to construct a sample of private firms best suited to compare with the public firms. We only 
keep observations with positive sales and total assets. We exclude observations with missing 
values in key variables, such as cash holdings or whether the firm is public. The cleaned full 
sample consists of 780,571 firm-year observations, 23% of the original observations. There 
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are 155,566 unique firms and 13 years (2000-2012) of observations. The sample consists of 
779,113 private and 1,458 public firm-year observations. 
4.3 Matching 
According to prior work, such as Harford (1999), and Opler et al. (1999), cash holdings varies 
between industries and with firm size. Miller and Orr’s (1996) model of demand for cash 
suggests economies of scale in cash holding, and larger firms will thus on average have lower 
cash ratios. Consequently, we match observations on size and industry, following prior 
matching procedures from Gao et al. (2013), and Asker et. al. (2014).  
We use book value of total assets as size, as we do not have market values for most private 
firms. To differentiate on industry we use 12 industry groups (Table 3). For each public firm-
year observation we find a private match in the same year, same industry and closest in size. 
We match with replacement. Hence, one private firm-year observation can be a match for 
several public firm-year observations 
The matching procedure result in a matched sample with 1,458 public and 1,458 private firm-
year observations. To decide whether this is a good matching procedure, we look at the size 
distributions before and after the matching, presented in Figure 1. In the first graph, the two 
size distributions shows that public firms are much larger in our full sample. The second graph 
shows that the two size distributions are more similar in the matched sample, and we thus 
believe the matching procedure improves our analysis. The aim is to make the two samples 
most alike, except for whether the firm is public or private. Consequently, we will use the 
matched sample in most of our analyses.  
4.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our variables for public, private and matched private 
firms. The variables are either collected directly or calculated based on data from the SNF 
database. All continuous variables except Sales growth are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
level to reduce impact from outliers. Sales growth is winsorized at the 5% and 95% level, due 
to unrealistic outliers that we consider being errors in the reported figures. We test the 
differences in means between public and private firms for all variables in the matched sample 
using a Hotelling’s T2 test. Table 2 presents a technical description of the construction of the 
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variables, linked back to SNF’s original notations. The following section present a more 
practical discussion of the descriptive statistics.  
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ is the sum of cash and marketable securities scaled by total assets. We include 
marketable securities, as we consider it an equivalent to excess cash. These liquid investments 
are unrelated to the firm’s operations and can easily be transferred into cash. Cash is on 
average 1.78 percentage points higher for public firms than for private firms in our matched 
sample, and the difference is significant. Figure 3 provides the development in mean cash 
holdings for the firms in our matched sample. Cash is significantly higher for public firms in 
the years leading up to the financial crisis in 2007/2008, but the difference is marginal in the 
years thereafter. Cash is higher for private firms in our full sample, due to many small firms 
with high cash levels. When controlling for size, public firms have higher cash levels in both 
samples. 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 is the book value of total assets, as we do not have market values for private 
firms. Naturally, total assets are significantly higher for public firms in the full sample. Hence, 
we perform the matching in order to get a more comparable sample. 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇ℎ is 
percentage change in sales, and is higher for private firms in the matched sample, but the 
difference is not significant. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ 𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 is earnings after interest and taxes, but before 
depreciation, scaled by total assets. Cash flow is significantly higher for private firms in both 
samples. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ 𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣 is the standard deviation of the cash flow for each firm within 
the time-period. Private firms have significantly higher cash flow volatility than public firms 
in the full sample, but lower cash flow volatility in the matched sample. The large difference 
in the full sample is probably due to a higher cash flow volatility in smaller firms.  
𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 is the change in fixed assets plus depreciation, scaled by total assets. This 
includes both capital expenditures, and mergers and acquisitions, as the database does not 
provide separate information on these items. Gross investment is significantly higher for 
private firms in the matched sample. 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 is EBITDA (Earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization) over total assets at the beginning of the year. ROA is 7.85 
percentage points higher for private firms in the matched sample. The large difference is 
economically interesting and we will discuss this further under Regression 4.  
𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇 𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑤𝑤𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔 𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 (NWC) is the sum of accounts receivable and inventory, less accounts 
payable and other operating current liabilities, scaled by total assets. Operating cash is not 
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included in NWC. Ideally, one should include operating cash in NWC and use excess cash as 
the cash variable (Koller, Goedhart, & Wessels, 2010). We have no information about 
operating cash, and thus find it most reasonable to include all cash in the cash variable. A 
normal level of operating cash may vary between industries, but we will control for this by 
using industry fixed effects in our analysis. In our matched sample, NWC is 2.63 percentage 
points higher for private firms.𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶 is the sum of all financial liabilities with 
less than one year to maturity scaled by total assets, and is higher for private firms. We believe 
that current liabilities positively affect cash level, since current liabilities increase the need for 
liquidity. 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷 (Research and Development) is the change in capitalized development, as 
research is not allowed to capitalize in Norway, scaled by total assets. Ideally, we want to use 
R&D expenditures as a variable, since firms with much R&D expenditures often hold more 
cash (Pinkowits, Stulz, & Williamson, 2012), but our database only provides the balance 
figures. R&D is marginally higher for public firms. 𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎 is the debt ratio, computed as 
total financial debt over total assets. Private firms have on average significantly higher 
leverage.  
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm has outstanding publicly traded debt. 
A higher share of public firms have public debt compared to private firms. 𝐷𝐷𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶 is a 
dummy on whether the firm paid dividends in the current year. Interestingly, more of our 
private firms in the matched sample pay dividend. We see that public firms are on average 6.6 
years older than the matched private firms are.  
When comparing private firms in the full sample with private firms in the matched sample, 
the matched private firms are on average larger, older with lower cash ratio and lower ROA.   
4.5 Regressions 
To perform our analysis we run several OLS (ordinary least square) regressions. All 
regressions in this thesis have heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 
4.5.1 Cash holding 
Our base regression is the determination of cash level. We have the natural logarithm (ln) to 
cash level as the dependent variable. Using ln enables us to see the percentage difference in 
cash level between public and private firms. We include control variables we believe have an 
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effect on the cash level. The selection is based on cash theories and prior work from Gao et. 
al. (2013). We include industry and year fixed effects to control for industry and time variation.  
Regression 1; Cash level: 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ) = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶) + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ 𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 +
𝛽𝛽4𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ 𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇ℎ + 𝛽𝛽6𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇 +
𝛽𝛽8𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇 𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑤𝑤𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔 𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐷𝐷𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽11𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷 +
𝛽𝛽12𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹𝑣𝑣𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎) + 𝛽𝛽13𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶 + 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑣𝑣 & 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 + 𝜀𝜀  
Hypothesis 1 predicts higher cash level in public firms than in private firms, e.g. a positive 
value for 𝛽𝛽1. In that case, the agency effect is stronger than the transaction and precautionary 
effects. Consequently, we can conclude that agency costs leads to higher cash level for public 
firms. If cash level is higher for private firms, there might be agency problems, but we cannot 
conclude. There is always a possibility that other factors explains this difference, but our 
matching procedure and control variables minimize this risk.  
4.5.2 Speed of adjustment (SOA) 
The second set of regressions aims to analyze differences in how fast public and private firms 
adjust cash level to a target level (Cash*). 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ∗ is a proxy for the optimal cash level for a 
firm with its given characteristics, and is predicted from regression 1 on private firms (Column 
8). This methodology is based on Gao et al. (2013) and the assumption that private firms face 
less agency problems and thus have a more optimal cash level. A potential problem with this 
approach is that the precautionary demand for cash is higher for private firms, which is 
imposed on public firms and may overestimate public firms’ need for precautionary cash 
holdings. 
Regression 2; Speed of adjustment: 
∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ ∗ −𝐿𝐿. 𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ) + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐 × (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ ∗ −𝐿𝐿. 𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ) + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐 + 𝜀𝜀   (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ ∗  − 𝐿𝐿. 𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ) measures the discrepancy between a firm’s current cash level and next 
year’s target cash level. The coefficient β1 will measure at which speed a private firm adjusts 
toward the target, based on the need to adjust. Β2 measures the difference in SOA between 
public and private firms. We will analyze how SOA differs in the case of cash shortfall and 
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excess cash, by dividing the sample into different subsamples based on the degree of 
discrepancy between lagged cash and target cash.  
Without agency issues, we expect public firms to be able to adjust upward faster in the case 
of cash shortfall, due to easier access to external capital. Adjusting down if excess cash is more 
ambiguous, but we have no reason to believe that private firms should be able to adjust faster. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts 𝛽𝛽2 to be negative in the case of excess cash, but positive in the case of 
cash shortfall.     
4.5.3 Disgorging excess cash 
As an extension to the SOA-analysis, we analyze the use of excess cash. If a firm wants to 
disgorge excess cash, there are three main options. To increase investment, debt repayment or 
dividends. Consequently, we look at how these three categories differs between public and 
private firms. As dependent variables we use dummies taking the value 1 if the firm increased 
payout, investment or debt repayment respectively, in the current year. In Investment we 
include both capex, M&A and R&D investments. We control for size, cash flow, volatility, 
sales growth, dividends, leverage, firm age, and include industry and year fixed effects.  
Regression 3; Disgorging excess cash 
𝑌𝑌 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶) + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ 𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ 𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣 +
𝛽𝛽5𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇ℎ + 𝛽𝛽6𝐷𝐷𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹𝑣𝑣𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎) +
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑣𝑣 & 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 + 𝜀𝜀  
 Y = Increase payout, investment and debt repayment respectively 
The methodology is based on Gao et. al. (2013). Our motivation for this analysis is to detect 
any agency problems that may affect the disgorging of excess cash. Hypothesis 1 predicts a 
negative 𝛽𝛽1 for the payout regression, which means a lower probability for increase in dividend 
payments for public firms compared to private firms. Corporate finance theory states that debt 
has a disciplining effect on managers. Hence, a manager searching for more flexibility may 
have incentives to spend excess cash on debt repayment, but this prediction is more 
ambiguous.  
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4.5.4 Performance 
We analyze how cash holdings affects performance, and how this effect differs in public and 
private firms. We use ROA as measure of performance. ROA is calculated as EBITDA over 
total assets. EBITDA is widely used in corporate finance (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014), and we 
believe it is the most proper measure of earnings. EBITDA is the earnings from the operations, 
but is not affected by differences in depreciation policies and capital structure.  
Regression 4:  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿.𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ + 𝛽𝛽3𝐿𝐿.𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ × 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶) +
𝛽𝛽5𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹𝑣𝑣𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎) + 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑣𝑣 & 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 + 𝜀𝜀  
Cash is in lagged to avoid a relationship where cash is a result of current year’s EBITDA. We 
control for size and age. As a robustness check we also run the regression with ROCE (Return 
on capital employed) as the dependent variable. ROCE is calculated as EBIT (Earnings before 
interest and tax) over capital employed. Capital employed is the sum of equity and debt, or 
total assets less current liabilities.  
There may be more risk attached to private firm’s share price and liquidity, compared to public 
firms. However, there is no reason to expect differences in operational risk and return between 
public and private firms when controlling for industry and size. Whether cash in general has a 
positive effect on ROA is not clear, but we believe too much cash can have a negative effect 
on ROA. Hence, we create a subsample with the 25% percentile of highest cash level to 
investigate differences between the overall sample and high cash sample. Hypothesis 4 
predicts that excess cash has a stronger negative effect on public firm’s performance, 
compared to private firm’s performance. This intuition is based on the assumptions of higher 
cash levels in public firms, due to agency costs, and that excess cash destroys value. For our 
regression, hypothesis 4 suggests a negative value for 𝛽𝛽3. 
4.5.5 Investment level 
We further analyze how cash holdings affect investment level. Our focus is to investigate how 
cash is a determination of investment level, and how it differs between public and private 
firms. For investment level we use gross investment as the dependent variable. Gross 
investment is the change in fixed assets plus depreciation. We believe gross investment is a 
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better measure than net investment as gross investment provide the actual investment spending 
for the year. Gross investment includes both capex and M&A, as these items are not reported 
separately in our dataset.  
Regression 5; Investment level: 
𝐺𝐺𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿.𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ + 𝛽𝛽3𝐿𝐿.𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ × 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐 +
𝛽𝛽4𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶) + 𝛽𝛽5𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇ℎ + 𝛽𝛽6𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖(𝐹𝐹𝑣𝑣𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎) + 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑣𝑣 & 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 + 𝜀𝜀  
We control for size, sales growth and age. Sales growth is often used as a proxy for investment 
opportunities, for example in Michaely and Roberts (2012) and Asker et. al. (2014). We use 
cash in lagged to avoid a relationship where cash is a result of current year’s investments. One 
should expect public firms to be able to invest more, due to easier access to external capital. 
However, Asker et. al. (2014) find evidence that American public firms invest less than their 
private counterparts do, and relate this to agency problems and short-term focused managers. 
These findings are consistent with Stein (1989), and the theory of myopic behavior by 
managers in public firms.  
How one should expect cash level and agency costs to affect investment level is more 
ambiguous. For an empire-building manager, the correlation between cash and investment is 
expected to vary with time. We may observe a positive correlation in a period where the 
manager uses last period’s excess cash on overinvestments. In a period where the manager is 
stocking cash in wait for large investments, we may observe a negative correlation. If the goal 
itself is high cash holdings, suggested by the free cash flow hypothesis and the quiet life 
theory, there may be a negative correlation as managers will forego potential investments in 
order to stock cash. As agency theories do not provide a clear prediction of cash’s effect on 
investment level, we do not create a separate hypothesis for regression 5. 
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4.7 HHI-matched sample 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) measures industry competition and is calculated: 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼 = �𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
 
Si is market share for firm i. A higher HHI means a more concentrated market, e.g. less 
competition. We calculate HHI in our full sample based on two-digit industry codes, and 
construct a new matched sample based on HHI. For each public firm-year observation, we 
look for a private match with the same HHI, same year and closest in size. This procedure 
provides a matched sample with 1,217 public and 1,217 private firm-year observations. The 
sample is divided further into three equally sized subsamples based on HHI, labeled High-, 
Medium- and Low competition respectively. 
We have two motives for incorporating HHI in our research. First, as discussed by Giroud and 
Mueller (2010), competition might mitigate agency problems and managerial slack. If this is 
the case, we should expect less difference in cash level between public and private firms in 
highly competitive industries, given hypothesis 1. We thus expect a positive relationship 
between HHI and cash level for public firms. Consequently, we run regression 1 in the HHI-
matched sample and include HHI as an independent variable and in interaction with cash.  
Second, as described in the theory section, there are potential product market competition 
motives to hold cash. Consequently, it is interesting to investigate how cash holdings affect 
performance in the three subsamples. We run regression 5 in the HHI-matched sample and 
included HHI as an independent variable. If excess cash has a positive effect on performance 
in competitive industries, we expect either higher cash levels or a more positive effect on ROA 
from cash holdings, compared to less competitive industries.  
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5. Results 
5.1 Cash holding 
In the first regression (Table 4) we analyze how different factors affect cash holdings, with 
focus on the Public variable. In the full sample we find significant differences in cash holdings 
between public and private firms, both when controlling for size only (Column 1) and when 
controlling for other variables (Column 2). The coefficient for the Public variable is 0.636 in 
the full sample. This indicates that public firms hold 89%(℮(0,636) − 1) more cash than 
private firms do, which is a notable difference. In the matched sample we still find higher cash 
holdings in public firms (Columns 3-4), but the difference is smaller than in the full sample. 
This is natural, because public firms are on average larger than private firms are, and the 
differences in firm characteristics are thus larger in the whole sample. The coefficient for 
Public in the matched sample is 0.096, which means that public firms hold 10% �℮(0,096) − 1� 
more cash than their private counterparts do. This result is consistent with research from the 
US (Gao, Harford, & Li, 2013), where public firms hold between 48% and 55% more cash 
than private firms do. Since both transaction and precautionary motives for holding cash are 
perceived higher for private firms, we attribute this difference to agency costs. When we split 
the sample into a pre-financial crisis sample (Column 5) and a during/after sample (Column 
6), we find significant differences between public and private firms before the crisis, but no 
significant differences from 2008 onwards. From Figure 3 we see that the differences in cash 
holdings disappear in 2008 and are marginal in the years thereafter.  We believe this is due to 
less room for managerial slack under and after the crisis. Another potential explanation is that 
private firms have become more concerned with precautionary actions after the crisis.  
Other interesting variables are also affecting cash holdings. The coefficient for total assets, 
leverage and current liabilities are significant in most of the regressions. Larger firms have 
lower cash levels than smaller firms, in line with the economics of scale argument (Mulligan, 
1997). Higher leverage decrease cash holdings, and the effect is strongest in the matched 
sample. Highly levered firms pay back debt instead of stocking cash, which decrease the risk 
attributed to capital structure. The coefficient for net working capital is negative and 
significant at the 1% level in all regressions, which supports the theory that cash is used as 
collateral when NWC is low. Current liabilities affect cash negatively. We would expect 
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current liabilities to correlate positively with cash holdings, as current liabilities increase the 
need for liquidity.  
We also regress cash holdings on public and private firms separately (Column 7 and 8). This 
separation shows that dividends and firm age have opposing effects on cash holdings. 
Dividends have a large negative effect on public firms’ cash level, but a small positive effect 
on private firms’ cash level. A potential explanation is that private firms only pay dividends 
when cash flow is sufficient, but public firms smooth dividends when cash is needed 
elsewhere, as supported by Michaely & Roberts (2012). Firm age affects cash differently.  
Private firms hold less cash when age increases, but an opposite relationship for public firms. 
Older firms have in general less growth opportunities, less capital need and a positive cash 
flow. Hence, we would assume that older firms have less incentive for holding cash reserves, 
as seen in private firms. Public firms hold more cash when age increase, which indicates higher 
agency costs in older public firms. Cash holdings and cash flow volatility correlate negatively 
for private firms, opposite off our assumption. We would expect higher volatility in cash flow 
to cause higher cash holdings as a precautionary action. We run a Chow test to check whether 
the coefficients are significantly different between the public and private firms in the matched 
sample (Column 9). All the mentioned coefficients, except leverage are significantly different. 
We find support for hypothesis 1, that public firms hold more cash than private firms do. This 
indicates agency problems in public firms, as neither of the other motives predict higher cash 
holdings for public firms. The observed difference is a conservative projection of agency 
cost’s effect on cash level in public firms, as transactions and precautionary motives predict 
lower cash levels for public firms and we only observe the net effect. When analyzing the 
coefficients related to precautionary demand, such as cash flow volatility, R&D and size, we 
do not find evidence of demand for precautionary cash.  
5.2 Speed of adjustment 
This regression (Table 6) measures how fast firms adjust their cash level to an estimated 
optimal level. The coefficient for (Cash* - L.Cash) is positive (0.339), while the coefficient 
for Public x (Cash* - L.Cash) is negative (-0.097), both significant at the 1% level. This 
indicates that both public and private firms actively adjust cash holdings towards the optimal 
level. Public firms are marginally slower to adjust to the optimal level than private firms are. 
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There may be issues with heterogeneity between public and private firms. One issue could be 
asymmetric costs related to adjusting the cash level, both when building or depleting the cash 
holdings towards the optimal level. The sample is divided into quartiles based on discrepancies 
between lagged cash and target cash level. The more interesting analysis is for the subsample 
with most excess cash (P25) and highest cash shortfall (P75), as managers may have different 
incentives to adjust in these two cases. By using the top and bottom quartile, our analysis is 
less prone to errors in our modelled optimal cash, since it is hard to predict the optimal cash 
level. 
There are significant differences in the speed of the adjustment in the excess cash subsample. 
The coefficient for (Cash – Lagged Cash) is positive (0,269) and significant at the 1% level. 
The coefficient for Public x (Cash* - Lagged Cash) is negative (-0,140) and significant at the 
10% level. This variable cancels out some of the effect of the former variable, which indicates 
that private firms adjust faster. This result is in line with Gao et al. (2013), and supports 
hypothesis 2, as managers in public firms are more reluctant to adjust down cash level.  
Private firms also adjust their cash level faster than their public counterparts do in a cash 
shortfall. The coefficients for (Cash – Lagged Cash) is positive(0,619) and significant at the 
1% level. In contrast to Gao et al.’s (2013) findings, the coefficient for Public x (Cash* - 
Lagged Cash) is negative(−0,491) and significant at the 1% level. The coefficients almost 
cancel each other out for public firms. This means that private firms explain most of the 
coefficient for (Cash – Lagged Cash). Hence, public firms have a lower level of adjustment. 
This result contradicts hypothesis 2. A potential explanation is that public firms have less need 
to adjust up because the optimal cash level for public firms is lower than for a private 
counterpart with the same characteristics. 
5.3 Disgorging Cash 
Table 7 presents the results for regression 3. There is no significant difference in dividend 
payment between public and private firms (Column 1). This result does not provide support 
to hypothesis 3. Our analysis on increase in investment shows no significant difference 
between public and private firms (Column 2). Public firms are more likely to spend excess 
cash on debt repayment (Column 3), which may be explained by agency costs. Managers 
seeking flexibility will have incentive to decrease debt level, as high debt has a disciplining 
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effect on management. However, debt repayment is often a result of long-term agreements 
with the creditors, and not a year-by-year strategic choice, and thus we cannot be too 
conclusive.  
5.4 Performance 
Table 8 presents a simple T2 test for comparing means in ROA. We create a subsample, high 
cash, which is the firms with the top 25% percentile cash levels. The rest of the sample is 
labeled low cash. There are 371 public and 359 private firms in the high cash subsample, so 
the allocation of private versus public is sufficiently even. Two trends are clear. ROA is 
significantly lower for public firms and high cash firms.   
The results from regression 4, with ROA as dependent variable, are presented in Table 9. Table 
10 presents the same analysis with ROCE as the dependent variable. From column 1, we 
observe a negative effect from cash on ROA. One standard deviation increase in cash level 
results in 0.85 percentage points (0.223*0.038) decrease in ROA. With ROCE as dependent 
variable, the corresponding coefficient is insignificant. In all cases, both size and firm age have 
a positive effect on performance. 
Column 2 shows that public firms have on average 9.3 percentage points lower ROA than their 
private counterparts have. The difference is significant at the 1% level and a difference of 9.3 
percentage points is major in an economic sense. In our matched sample, public firms have 
higher cash flow volatility than private firms do, with 16.98% compared to 15.10%. 
Consequently, we can conclude that private firms have a significantly better risk-adjusted 
operating performance, compared to public firms. The difference is 15.7% and significant at 
the 1% level, when using ROCE as the dependent variable. Accordingly, the conclusion is 
robust, and in line with research on UK firms (Akguc & Choi, 2013). 
Column 3 shows that the difference in ROA between public and private is lower (7.3 
percentage points) when we include cash as a control variable. The difference is still 
significant at the 1% level. Cash seems to explain some of the difference in performance 
between public and private firms. Cash has a negative impact on ROA, but there is no 
significant difference between public and private on how cash affects ROA. In column 4, we 
use High cash as a dummy variable instead of cash as a continuous variable. Still, the 
coefficient for Public is significantly negative. Private firms in the high cash subsample have 
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a lower ROA than private firms in general, while for public firms the difference is larger. 
Hence, we can conclude that high cash levels seems to have a negative effect on both public 
and private firms. High cash level has a significantly stronger negative impact on public firms, 
compared to private firms. This conclusion is robust when using ROCE as dependent variable, 
and supports hypothesis 4. 
How much one standard deviation increase in cash affects performance can be very different 
for a firm with low cash holding, than for a firm with excess cash. An increase in cash might 
be positive for a firm with cash shortfall, but negative for a firm with excess cash. The 
observed coefficient is the net of these two types of conditions. We are most interested in 
investigating excess cash’s effect on ROA. Hence, we perform the same analyzes in the High 
cash subsample. In column 5, we observe a stronger negative relationship between cash level 
and ROA, compared to the whole sample. One standard deviation increase in cash level will 
decrease ROA by 3.96 percentage points (0.477*0.083). The relationship is almost the same 
when using ROCE as dependent variable. Public firms in the high cash sample has on average 
10.7 percentage points lower ROA than their private counterparts have (Column 6). This 
difference is 18.9 percentage points when looking at ROCE. All these coefficients are 
significant at the 1% level.  
From column 5 and 6, we can conclude that both the negative effect on ROA from cash level 
and the difference between public and private firms are larger in the high cash subsample 
compared to the whole matched sample. However, in column 7, when including both public, 
cash and interactions, the public dummy variable is marginal and insignificant. Cash is 
negative and significant at the 5% level. One standard deviation increase in cash level will 
decrease ROA by 4.67 percentage points (0.321*0.136). The coefficient for the interaction 
between cash and public is negative, but insignificant. When looking at ROCE, we observe 
the opposite. The coefficient for Cash is insignificant, but the coefficient for the interaction 
variable is significant. The coefficient for Public is still insignificant. 
We find clear evidence that private firms have better performance than public firms do, and 
this difference is larger in the high cash subsample. This difference is economically interesting 
and should be subject to further research. However, in the high cash subsample, the difference 
seems to be explained by cash level, and not by public versus private itself. We can conclude 
that cash level has a negative effect on ROA for public firms in the high cash sample. For 
private firms the relationship is a little more ambiguous, as the coefficient in the ROCE 
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regression is insignificant. These results support hypothesis 4. Excess cash have a stronger 
negative effect on performance for public firms.  
Another potential explanation is that cash creates return that is not included in ROA. Direct 
return from cash is included as financial income. Hence, we include financial income in the 
ROA calculation (Table 11). The conclusions are not affected by this adjustment. For the 
whole sample (Column 1), the coefficients for Public and Cash is still negative and significant. 
For the high cash subsample (Column 3), the coefficient for Cash is negative and significant 
at the 5% level. Column 2 provides evidence that firms in the high cash subsample have lower 
performance, and that this negative effect is strongest for public firms. Hence, we can conclude 
that the financial income cash provides does not make up for the reduction in operational 
return.  Consequently, there are clear indications that firms in the high cash subsample hold 
too much cash. The cash ratios in the subsample varies from 21% to 87%, and this seems high 
according to traditional financial theories on optimal cash holding. The problem is larger for 
public firms.  
5.5 Investment level 
Table 12 presents the means in gross investment. We divide the sample into public versus 
private and high cash versus low cash. High cash is the top 25% percentile. We observe that 
investment level is significantly higher for private firms. There are no significant differences 
between low cash and high cash. 
Regression 5 (Table 13) shows how cash holdings affect investment and how it differs between 
public and private firms. Cash holdings do not affect investment significantly (Column 1). 
Controlled for investment opportunities, cash holdings should not affect investment for a 
rational firm. Private firms have 8.3 percentage points higher investment level than public 
firms do (Column 2). The result is significant at the 1% level. Public firms have easier access 
to external capital, and should thus be able to invest more. Agency costs in public firms is a 
possible explanation, as managers with short-term goals may forego profitable investments in 
order to boost current earnings. This conclusion is in line with Asker et al. (2014). When 
interacting high cash and public, we see that public firms with high cash holdings have lower 
investment levels. When we analyze the high cash subsample, we find no significant 
differences between public and private firms or on cash’s effect on investment level. 
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The control variables provide the predicted results. Firms invest less with age, because older 
firms already have previous large investments. Sales growth has a positive effect on 
investments towards all investment regressions. This relationship is expected, as sales growth 
is a commonly used proxy for investment opportunities. 
5.6 HHI-matched sample 
5.6.1 Cash holding 
Table 14 presents the results from the cash level regressions in the HHI-matched sample. 
Column 1 shows that HHI alone has no significant effect on cash level. In column 2, the 
coefficient for Public is negative and significant at the 1% level. While the coefficient for HHI 
is negative and insignificant, the interaction variable for HHI and public is strongly positive 
and significant. Accordingly, public firms seem to have higher cash levels when there is less 
competition. If we believe agency problems cause the difference between public and private 
firms, these results are in line with Giroud and Mueller’s (2010) findings that competition 
mitigates agency costs. If we look at the mean values of cash in the three subsamples (Table 
15), cash increases with competition, which is the opposite of the coefficient in column 2. 
However, we emphasize results from the regressions over a simple mean comparison, as the 
regression includes important control variables. Private firms have higher cash levels in the 
medium competition subsample, compared to the high- and low competition subsamples. Cash 
holding theories does not support this finding, thus we find no meaningful explanation.  
Column 3-5 (Table 14) shows the determinants of cash level with different degrees of 
competition. It is hard to give a good conclusion from these results. In both the high- and low 
competition subsample, the coefficient for Public is positive, but insignificant. In the medium 
competition subsample, cash level is significantly lower for public firms. To sum up, it seems 
like HHI can be a partial explanation of the differences in cash levels, but there is no evidence 
of a clear relationship. We cannot conclude that competition mitigates agency costs, based on 
these results.  
5.6.2 Performance 
Table 16 presents the results from the performance regressions in the HHI-matched sample. 
Column 1 shows that HHI has a negative effect on ROA, which is significant at the 1% level. 
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One standard deviation increase in HHI will decrease ROA by 0.36 percentage points 
(0.121*0.030). Two opposing effects determinate the coefficient for HHI. First, all else equal, 
increased competition will on average lead to lower return. Second, market concentration is 
potentially a result of profitability, meaning that there are many competitors in industries with 
the potential of high return. We observe the net effect, and the second effect seems to be 
strongest in our case.  
Column 2 includes Public as a separate variable and in interaction with HHI. The coefficient 
for Public is -0.105. The coefficient for HHI is -0.184, while the coefficient for the interaction 
between HHI and public is 0.115,  This means that both public and private firms have higher 
ROA when competition increase, but private firm’s ROA are more sensitive to HHI. The three 
coefficients are all significant at the 1% level. 
Column 3-5 shows the results when dividing the sample into the three subsamples high-, 
medium- and low competition. We observe two interesting results. First, the difference in 
ROA between public and private firms decreases with less competition. This corresponds to 
the results in column 2. Second, cash level has a stronger negative effect on ROA when 
competition is lower. With high competition, cash has no significant effect on ROA. For 
medium competition, the coefficient for Cash is negative and significant at the 1% level. One 
standard deviation increase in cash will decrease ROA by 0.70 percentage points. For high 
cash, the negative effect is stronger and significant at the 1% level. One standard deviation 
increase in cash will reduce ROA by 1.26 percentage points (0.207*0.061). Table 17 shows 
that the average cash level is lower in the low competition subsample, compared to the two 
other subsamples. Consequently, even though firms on average have lower cash levels when 
competition is low, the negative effect of cash on ROA is stronger, compared to medium 
competition.  
The findings on cash level’s effect on ROA in column 3-5 gives support to product market 
competition arguments discussed in the theory section, stating that a high cash level may have 
a strategic benefit when competition is high. We do not find direct evidence that cash is 
positive with high competition, but that cash has a clear negative effect on ROA when 
competition is low. This relationship can also be a result of managerial slack in lack of 
competition, which leads to a less efficient use of cash. Accordingly, we can conclude that 
there are better arguments for holding excess cash in highly competitive markets.  
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6. Conclusion 
Using accounting and corporate data for Norwegian firms from 2000 to 2012, we match on 
industry and size, and compare Norwegian public and private firms’ cash holdings. Public 
firms hold on average more cash than their private counterparts do. This finding supports the 
hypothesis stating that agency problems in public firms lead to higher cash levels as managers 
value the flexibility cash provides. Further, we find evidence that public firms have lower 
performance, compared to private firms.  
Excess cash has a negative effect on performance, measured by ROA. Firms within the top 
25% percentile of cash levels have a significant lower ROA compared to the rest of the sample. 
Excess cash affects both public and private firms negatively, but the effect is stronger for 
public firms. This result is robust towards different measures of performance, and provides 
further support to the hypothesis of agency problems in public firms. Cash has a stronger 
negative effect on performance when competition is low. This indicates support to product 
market competition arguments for holding excess cash in competitive industries.   
The main findings implicates that firms with excessive cash holdings should pay out more of 
the cash as dividends, as excess cash has a negative effect on performance. This is particularly 
a problem in public firms. Consequently, shareholders in public firms should pay closer 
attention to the firm’s cash policy.  
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8. Appendix 
Figure 1: Size distributions for public and private firms 
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Figure 2: Correlation matrix 
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1
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Figure 3: Development in cash holdings 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable
O
bservations
M
ean
M
edian
Std. Dev.
Cash
779,113
30.40%
22.60%
27.29%
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779,113
8,850
1,867
27,917
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3.85%
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Cash flow
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8.48%
29.92%
Cash flow
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0.00%
18.69%
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41.94%
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47.66%
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D
779,113
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0.00%
0.26%
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779,113
20.65%
2.13%
31.69%
Public debt
779,113
0.00
0
0.07
Dividends
779,113
0.26
0
0.44
Age
779,113
11.7
9
11.1
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M
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1,458
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11.00%
19.07%
1,458
16.13%
10.02%
17.71%
1.78%
***
Total assets
1,458
6,584,119
929,416
16,690,000
1,458
3,048,246
837,259
6,601,559
3,535,873***
Sales grow
th
1,458
32.66%
8.47%
91.91%
1,458
34.82%
7.77%
95.16%
-2.16%
Cash flow
1,458
0.65%
4.56%
18.64%
1,458
7.17%
6.36%
10.69%
-6.52%
***
Cash flow
 volatility
1,458
16.98%
9.20%
25.75%
1,458
15.10%
7.22%
31.31%
1.88%
*
Gross investm
ent
1,458
13.91%
4.97%
50.86%
1,458
23.18%
4.60%
86.50%
-9.27%
***
RO
A
1,458
4.11%
7.48%
26.92%
1,458
11.96%
9.94%
22.78%
-7.85%
***
N
et w
orking capital
1,458
7.84%
4.92%
17.58%
1,458
10.47%
6.38%
19.71%
-2.63%
***
Current liabilities
1,458
30.34%
26.70%
19.21%
1,458
33.02%
29.31%
22.89%
-2.68%
***
R&
D
1,458
0.44%
0.00%
4.51%
1,458
0.39%
0.00%
3.58%
0.05%
Leverage
1,458
20.50%
16.40%
19.82%
1,458
27.89%
22.67%
24.67%
-7.39%
***
Public debt
1,458
0.12
0
0.33
1,458
0.03
0
0.17
0.09***
Dividends
1,458
0.04
0
0.20
1,458
0.13
0
0.34
-0.09***
Age
1,458
29.4
15
33.6
1,458
22.8
14
25.8
6.6***
This table provides descriptive statistics for private firm
s (full and m
atched sam
ple) and public firm
s. All continous variables are w
insorized at the 1%
 and 99%
 level, execpt 
for Sales grow
th that is w
insorized at the 5%
 and 95%
 level. ***, ** and * is statistical significance in the differnece in m
ean (Hotelling's T-square test) at a 1%
, 5%
 and 10 %
 
level respectively. See Appendix 2 for how
 variables are constructed.
Private firm
s, full sam
ple
Public firm
s
M
atched private firm
s
Difference in m
ean 
(Public - Private)
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Table 2: Construction of variables 
 
Original variable names from the SNF database in brackets. 
 
Cash = ( Cash [Cash] + Marketable securities [invest] ) / Total assets [sumeiend] 
Total assets = Total assets [sumeiend] 
Sales growth = ( Sales [salgsinn] – L.Sales [L.salgsinn] ) / L.Sales [L.salgsinn] 
Cash flow = ( Net income [ordres] + Depreciations & Amortizations [anlvurd] *0.72 
Cash flow volatility = Standard deviation of Cash flow within a firm 
Gross investment = ( Fixed assets [vardrmdl] – L.Fixed assets [L.vardrmdl] ) / L.Fixed assets 
[L.vardrmdl] 
ROA = EBITDA [ebitda] / L.Total assets [L.sumeiend] 
Net working capital = ( Receivables [fordr] + Inventory [varer] – Payables [levgj] – Other 
current operating liabilities [akgjeld] ) / Total assets [sumeiend] 
Current liabilities = Current liabilites [kgjeld] / Total assets [sumeiend] 
R&D = ( Research [fou] + Patents [patent] ) / Total assets [sumeiend] - ( L.Research [L.fou] 
+ L.Patents [L.patent] ) / L.Total assets [L.sumeiend] 
Leverage = Long term debt [alanggj] / Total assets [sumeiend] 
Public debt (dummy) = 1 if outstanding publicly traded debt [obllaan] > 0  
Dividends (dummy) = 1 if dividends [utb] > 0 
Age = Year [aar] – Year of establishment [stiftaar] 
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Table 3: Industry groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry groups: Observations
Primary industries 59
Oil & Gas 120
Industry 711
Construction 91
Commerce 229
Shipping 290
Transportation/Travel 18
Finance/Insurance 48
Services/Real Estate/Consulting 501
Culture/Media 14
IT/Telecom 353
Total 2,434
This table presents how the firms in the  matched 
sample is spread on industry groups
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Table 4: Regression 1 – Cash level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ln(Cash) as dependent variable
2000-2007 2008-2012 Public firms Private firms
(7)-(8)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Public 0.530*** 0.636*** 0.331*** 0.096* 0.187*** -0.072
[0.031] [0.030] [0.050] [0.051] [0.062] [0.087]
Ln(Total assets) -0.210*** -0.237*** -0.048*** -0.071*** -0.112*** -0.012 -0.107*** 0.000 8.00***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.016] [0.017] [0.023] [0.022 [0.019] [0.028]
Cash flow 0.418*** 0.221 0.571*** -0.367 -0.008 1.223*** 6.08**
[0.007] [0.162] [0.194] [0.288] [0.168] [0.409]
Cash flow volatility 0.001 -0.651*** -0.355*** -1.002*** -0.194 -0.861*** 16.14***
[0.002] [0.112] [0.136] [0.184] [0.163] [0.142]
Sales growth 0.066*** 0.024 0.082*** -0.036 0.065* -0.025 2.48
[0.003] [0.027] [0.030] [0.054] [0.035] [0.039]
Leverage -1.421*** -2.411*** -2.339*** -2.529*** -2.331*** -2.182*** 0.49
[0.007] [0.141] [0.174] [0.249] [0.194] [0.211]
Public debt -0.137*** 0.131 0.035 0.217* 0.140 -0.189 4.31**
[0.024] [0.090] [0.130] [0.117] [0.099] [0.179]
Net working capital -1.426*** -2.233*** -2.384*** -2.055*** -1.656*** -2.418*** 3.85**
[0.005] [0.157] [0.186] [0.283] [0.197] [0.238]
Gross investment -0.643*** 0.036 0.022 -0.010 0.026 0.086** 0.05
[0.008] [0.030] [0.034] [0.075] [0.050] [0.04]
Dividend 0.730*** 0.055 -0.193 0.279** -0.794*** 0.265*** 23.05***
[0.003] [0.093] [0.124] [0.136] [0.202] [0.100]
R&D -5.573*** -0.330 -0.566 -0.263 0.033 -1.964* 3.03*
[0.595] [0.511] [0.798] [0.614] [0.540] [1.033]
Ln(Firm age) 0.016*** -0.012 -0.035 0.053 0.071*** -0.101*** 10.41***
[0.002 [0.021] [0.027] [0.035] [0.026] [0.034]
Current liabilities -1.009*** -1.146*** -1.246*** -1.044*** -1.619*** -0.441* 15.68***
[0.005] [0.150] [0.184] [0.261] [0.186] [0.237]
Industry & year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.673*** 0.741*** -2.606*** -0.428 0.119 -1.492*** -0.482 -1.140**
[0.035] [0.032] [0.291] [0.315] [0.427] [0.463] [0.376] [0.535]
Observations 780571 780571 2916 2916 1844 1072 1458 1458
R-squared 7.8% 31.5% 9.1% 24.9% 27.1% 26.7% 29.5% 29.5%
Full sample
Matched sample
F statistic of 
Chow Test 
This table reports the results from regression 1. Industry and year fixed effects are used. All regressions have heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors. ***, ** and * corresponds to statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics, (Cash* - L.Cash) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for (Cash* - L.cash) 
Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
Matched sample -0.081 0.186 1,458 -0.065 0.154 1,458
Subsample - excess cash: -0.337 0.18 366 -0.279 0.127 361
Subsample - cash shortfall: 0.085 0.062 374 0.084 0.083 355
Public firms Private firms
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Table 6: Regression 2 – Speed of adjustments 
 
Change in cash ratio (ΔCash) as dependent variable
Matched sample Subsample - excess cash: Subsample - cash shortfall:
(Cash* - L.Cash) ≤ P25 (Cash* - L.Cash) ≥ P75
(1) (2) (3)
Cash* - L.Cash 0.339*** 0.269*** 0.619***
[0.025] [0.064] [0.097]
Public × (Cash* - L.Cash) -0.097*** -0.140* -0.491***
[0.032] [0.075] [0.139]
Public -0.002 -0.030 0.046***
[0.004] [0.021] [0.011]
Constant 0.016 -0.003 -0.015**
[0.003] [0.016] [0.007]
Observations 2916 727 729
R-squared 19.8% 4.8% 14.3%
This table reports the results from regression 2. Industry and year fixed effects are used. All regressions have 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. L means one lag. ***, ** and * corresponds to statistical 
significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 7: Regression 3 – Disgorging excess cash 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Increase payout Increase investment Increase debt repayment
(1) (2) (3)
Public 0.011 0.046 0.060*
[0.008] [0.041] [0.034]
Ln(total assets) -0.007** 0.0148 0.009
[0.004] [0.013] [0.011]
Cash flow 0.09*** 0.117 -0.068
[0.026] [0.108] [0.100]
Cash flow volatility 0.013 -0.093* -0.148***
[0.008] [0.051] [0.051]
Sales growth 0.01** 0.009 0.074***
[0.004] [0.019] [0.018]
Dividends 0.583*** 0.098 0.178***
[0.068] [0.075] [0.066]
Leverage -0.020 0.044 1.149***
[0.015] [0.102] [0.094]
Ln(Firm age) -0.007 0.064*** -0.075***
[0.004] [0.019] [0.016]
Industry and year FEs Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.115** -0.188 0.294
[0.055] [0.257] [0.185]
Observations 727 727 727
R-squared 0.586 0.149 0.341
Top 25% percentile of excess cash
This table reports the results from regression 3. Industry and year fixed effects are used. All regression are 
run with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. ***, ** and * corresponds to statistical significance at a 
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 8: Mean ROA 
 
Low cash High cash Total Difference (High cash - Low Cash)
Public 5.99% -1.39% 4.11% -7.38%***
Private 13.50% 7.23% 11.96% -6.27%***
Total 9.77% 2.85% 8.03% -6.92%***
Difference (Private - Public) 7.51%*** 8.62%*** 7.85%***
This table presents mean in ROA for Public vs. Private and Low cash vs. High cash. ***, ** and * is 
statistical significance in the differnece in mean (Hotelling's T-square test) at a 1%, 5% and 10 % 
level respectively.
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Table 9: Regression 4 – ROA 
 
ROA as dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Public -0.093*** -0.073*** -0.091*** -0.107*** 0.013
[0.009] [0.013] [0.009] [0.023] [0.070]
L.Cash -0.223*** -0.165*** -0.477*** -0.321**
[0.038] [0.056] [0.083] [0.136]
L.Cash × Public -0.087 -0.257
[0.075] [0.167]
High cash -0.051***
[0.016]
High cash × Public -0.145***
[0.019]
Ln(total assets) 0.026*** 0.032*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.044*** 0.052*** 0.041***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008]
Ln(Firm age) 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.047*** 0.055*** 0.053***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
Industry and year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.341*** -0.398*** -0.340*** -0.368*** -0.651*** -0.941*** -0.673***
[0.062] [0.062] [0.059] [0.061] [0.142] [0.156] [0.138]
Observations 2,916 2,916 2,916 2,916 2,916 730 730
R-squared 9.8% 10.7% 12.9% 11.4% 20.8% 18.0% 23.1%
High cash
Subsample -
This table reports the results from regression 4. Industry and year fixed effects are used. All regression 
are run with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. L means one lag. ***, ** and * corresponds to 
statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Matched sample
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Table 10: Regression 4b – ROCE 
 
ROCE as dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Public -0.157*** -0.115*** -0.148*** -0.189*** 0.027
[0.013] [0.018] [0.014] [0.031] [0.082]
L.Cash -0.068 0.074 -0.403*** -0.111
[0.047] [0.057] [0.100] [0.138]
L.Cash × Public -0.229** -0.482**
[0.090] [0.195]
High cash 0.035*
[0.018]
High cash × Public -0.149***
[0.023]
Ln(total assets) 0.029*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.043*** 0.048*** 0.037***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.012] [0.012] [0.011]
Ln(Firm age) 0.019*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.026** 0.040*** 0.038***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
Industry and year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.501*** -0.509*** -0.502*** -0.520*** -0.593*** -0.816*** -0.635***
[0.089] [0.085] [0.084] [0.085] [0.184] [0.195] [0.177]
Observations 2,916 2,916 2,916 2,916 2,916 730 730
R-squared 6.5% 11.4% 11.9% 11.5% 13.5% 16.0% 19.1%
Matched sample Subsample -
High cash
This table reports the results from regression 5b. Industry and year fixed effects are used. All 
regression are run with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. L means one lag. ***, ** and * 
corresponds to statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 11: Regression 4c – ROA w/financial income  
 
ROA (including financial income) as dependent variable
(1) (1) (2)
Public -0.077*** -0.094*** -0.012
[0.014] [0.009] [0.071]
L.Cash -0.128** -0.291**
[0.058] [0.137]
L.Cash × Public -0.096 -0.234
[0.077] [0.169]
High cash -0.035**
[0.016]
High cash × Public -0.140***
[0.019]
Ln(total assets) 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.043***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.008]
Ln(Firm age) 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.066***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.011]
Industry and year FEs Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.307*** -0.323*** -0.710***
[0.059] [0.061] [0.138]
Observations 2,916 2,916 730
R-squared 12.1% 11.0% 23.4%
Subsample: 
High cash
Matched sample
This table reports the results from regression 5c. Industry and year 
fixed effects are used. All regression are run with heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors. L means one lag.  ***, ** and * corresponds to 
statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 12: Mean gross investment 
 
Low cash High cash Total Difference (High cash - Low cash)
Public 13.84% 14.11% 13.91% 0.27%
Private 22.50% 25.27% 23.18% 2.27%
Total 18.19% 19.60% 18.54% 1.41%
Difference (Private - Public) 13.38%*** 11.16%** 9.27%***
This table presents mean in Gross investment for Public vs. Private and Low cash vs. High cash. 
***, ** and * is statistical significance in the differnece in mean (Hotelling's T-square test) at a 
1%, 5% and 10 % level respectively.
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Table 13: Regression 5 – Investment level 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public -0.083*** -0.078** -0.064** -0.030 -0.044
[0.023] [0.032] [0.026] [0.035] [0.104]
L.Cash -0.053 -0.027 0.070
[0.060] [0.077] [0.154]
L.Cash × Public -0.026 0.030
[0.097] [0.207]
High Cash 0.052
[0.047]
High Cash x Public -0.091**
[0.039]
Ln(total assets) 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.023 0.052*** 0.054***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.013] [0.014]
Sales growth 0.288*** 0.287*** 0.288*** 0.289*** 0.094** 0.092**
[0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.046] [0.046]
Ln(Firm age) -0.042*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.110*** -0.110***
[0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.024] [0.024]
Industry and year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.139 -0.148 -0.137 -0.160 -0.011 -0.061
[0.114] [0.114] [0.113] [0.113] [0.211] [0.228]
Observations 2916 2916 2916 2916 730 730
R-squared 18.9% 19.2% 19.2% 19.2% 34.5% 34.6%
High Cash
Matched sample Subsample-
This table reports the results from regression 5. Industry and year fixed effects are used. All 
regressions have heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. L means one lag. ***, ** and * 
corresponds to statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Gross investment as dependent variable
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Table 14: Regression 6a – Cash level (HHI) 
 
Ln(Cash) as dependent variable
Subsample: Subsample: Subsample:
High Medium Low
comp. comp. comp.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Public -0.203*** 0.127 -0.341*** 0.011
[0.062] [0.094] [0.079] [0.103]
HHI 0.054 -0.317
[0.141] [0.197]
HHI × Public 0.740***
[0.214]
Ln(total assets) -0.099*** -0.100*** -0.145*** 0.035 -0.136***
[0.017] [0.017] [0.038] [0.028] [0.026]
Cash flow 0.318** 0.245 0.417 -0.207 0.644**
[0.161] [0.166] [0.282] [0.268] [0.294]
Cash flow volatility -0.525*** -0.502*** -0.831*** -0.275 -0.391**
[0.113] [0.112] [0.193] [0.210] [0.188]
Sales growth 0.052 0.052 0.000 0.113* 0.063
[0.035] [0.034] [0.053] [0.065] [0.065]
Leverage -2.023*** -2.095*** -1.731*** -2.466*** -1.747***
[0.145] [0.152] [0.277] [0.261] [0.297]
Public debt 0.079 0.069 -0.412** 0.068 0.305**
[0.097] [0.095] [0.201] [0.171] [0.142]
Net working capital -1.962*** -1.926*** -1.843*** -1.882*** -2.209***
[0.133] [0.136] [0.265] [0.224] [0.221]
Gross investment 0.045 0.045 0.104 -0.169 0.111
[0.072] [0.070] [0.093] [0.115] [0.176]
Dividend -0.027 -0.054 0.177 -0.254 0.043
[0.088] [0.091] [0.171] [0.164] [0.152]
R&D -0.624 -0.648 -1.177 -0.980 0.275
[0.548] [0.551] [0.921] [1.058] [0.991]
Ln(Firm age) 0.022 0.029 0.017 0.001 0.023
[0.022] [0.022] [0.043] [0.033] [0.042]
Current liabilities -1.195*** -1.219*** -1.060*** -0.902*** -1.454***
[0.141] [0.144] [0.241] [0.239] [0.284]
Industry & year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.356 -0.234 -0.145 -2.346*** 0.138
[0.319] [0.320] [0.689] [0.752] [0.511]
Observations 2,434 2,434 810 812 812
R-squared 24.3% 24.8% 30.8% 27.7% 26.4%
Matched sample
Matched on HHI (2-digit) and size
This table reports the results from cash level regression in HHI matched sample. Industry and 
year fixed effects are used. All regressions have heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 
***, ** and * corresponds to statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 15: Mean cash in HHI-matched sample 
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Table 16: Regression 6b – ROA (HHI) 
 
 
 
ROA as the dependent variable
Subsample: Subsample: Subsample:
High Medium Low
comp. comp. comp.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Public -0.105*** -0.100*** -0.082*** -0.067***
[0.011] [0.016] [0.014] [0.015]
HHI -0.121*** -0.184***
[0.030] [0.035]
HHI × Public 0.115***
[0.041]
L.Cash -0.158*** -0.153*** -0.092 -0.162*** -0.207***
[0.032] [0.030] [0.062] [0.043] [0.061]
Ln(total assets) 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.022*** 0.033*** 0.024***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.007] [0.006] [0.005]
Ln(Firm age) 0.008** 0.013*** 0.002 0.005 0.025***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.007] [0.006] [0.005]
Industry and year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.280*** -0.277*** -0.307*** -0.157 -0.298***
[0.058] [0.057] [0.111] [0.136] [0.076]
Observations 2,434 2,434 810 812 812
R-squared 10.8% 14.9% 12.6% 19.8% 18.5%
Matched on HHI (2-digit) and size
Matched sample
This table reports the results from ROA regression in HHI matched sample. Industry and year 
fixed effects are used. All regressions have heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. L 
means one lag. ***, ** and * corresponds to statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level 
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Table 17: Mean ROA in HHI-matched sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High comp. Medium comp. Low comp.
Public 5.34% 3.22% 6.49%
Private 15.25% 10.42% 11.05%
Total 10.30% 6.83% 8.77%
This table presents mean ROA in HHI-matched sample. Public vs. 
Private and across High, Medium and Low competition
